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Culture, Society and Secularization: Literature and Religion in the German-
Speaking World 1830-1900   
John Walker 
 
As the last two chapters have shown, the periods 1700-1770 and 1770-1830 
both manifest a process of secularization in German literature which is closely 
related to the evolution of both religious practice and philosophical theology in 
the German-speaking lands. However, ‘secularization’ can mean at least three 
different things.1 First, it can mean the general or partial disappearance of 
religious faith and practice from society and its replacement by modes of 
consciousness which secular society defines. Second, it can mean the secular 
expression of ideas and principles which still manifest their origin in religious 
teaching. Thirdly, it can mean the objective transposition of the logic and 
dynamic of religious faith into the secular public consciousness, whether or not 
that transposition is manifest in or to the secular consciousness itself.  This third 
meaning is what Ernst Bloch called ‘man’s increasing entry into religious 
mystery’, the transfiguration of the world of common experience into the source 
of ultimate meaning.2 German literature between 1700 and 1830 certainly 
manifests a process of secularization in the second and third senses of the term. 
However, in the first sense of the term, there was no general process of 
secularization in the German-speaking world. It will be the thesis of this chapter 
that the German-speaking world from 1830 to 1900 does undergo a process of 
secularization in the first and most explicit sense of the term: the gradual 
replacement of religious modes of consciousness by secular ones in Germany in 
German culture and society as a whole. However, that process takes a very 
different form in the literature of nineteenth-century Germany from that which 
occurs in German theology and religious life at the same time. The difference 
                                                          
1 For a good overview of the multiple meanings of ‘secularization’, see Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age, trans. by Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1983), pp. 13-25. 
2  Ernst Bloch, Man on his Own, trans. by E. B. Ashton (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 147f. 
and the connection between the two kinds of secularization are both equally 
important for our understanding of German culture and society from 1830 to 
1900.  
Both religion and literature are what Charles Taylor has called 
interlocutions of moral space: symbolic languages through which we interrogate 
and bring to consciousness the human world we inhabit.3 However, like all 
languages the religious and the literary are always related to and yet different 
from each other; essential to and yet never identical with the moral world they 
describe. The religious and literary idioms are both especially closely related 
and radically different in the culture of nineteenth-century Germany. However, 
their articulation of the broader cultural process is by no means identical with 
the process itself. Both the religious and the literary languages enable us to see 
and to say some things about the human world which they both address. Yet 
they may also obscure other things about that world and indeed about each 
other. As modes of human understanding, they require hermeneutic 
interpretation themselves.  
This chapter will argue that the culture of nineteenth-century Germany 
displays both a real process of secularization in German society and a subjective 
response to that process in German culture, which occurs in very different ways 
in both ‘literature’ and ‘religion’. There is a real process of secularization, 
because the traditional content of Christian theology has in large part 
objectively been replaced by its modern reinterpretation in terms of secular 
thought and the needs of the society and culture which that thought reflects. 
However, religious consciousness is still subjectively present in the 
consciousness of the members of that society and culture. Germany is perhaps 
more objectively secularized - that is to say, its religious consciousness is more 
thoroughly detached from actual experience - than any other society in 
nineteenth-century Europe. But the subjective presence of that consciousness 
                                                          
3  Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self  (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 36 
remains undiminished. This inverse relationship, I will suggest, is one of the 
most important themes, and the source of some of the key modes, of German 
literature between 1830 and 1900. Both the political and the cultural history of 
Germany suggest the division of our period into three periods: 1830-1848; 
1848-1871; and 1871-1900. 
 
I  1830-1848: Desacralization versus Resacralization 
The period from 1830 to 1848, often known as the Vormärz, begins with the 
July revolution of 1830 which heralds a constitutional monarchy in France and 
its limited echoes in the German-speaking world (especially in Berlin, Munich 
and Vienna) and ends with the abortive attempt to establish a parliament in 
Frankfurt in 1848 and so the failure to achieve German reunification on a liberal 
and parliamentary basis. It is characterized both by an increased agitation in 
favour of parliamentary liberalism and by a corresponding reaction on the part 
of the state, especially in Prussia and Austria (the Swiss republic exhibits a 
more progressive political development during this time). In cultural terms, the 
period from 1830-1848 can roughly be defined in terms of two sharply 
contrasting reactions to the end of the Romantic movement in German 
literature: the radical literary movement known as Junges Deutschland (‘Young 
Germany’), which harnessed the legacy of German Idealist philosophy and 
theology in the service of political critique; and the more conservative 
movement known as Biedermeier, stronger in Austria and Switzerland than in 
Germany, which was informed by a quasi-theological aesthetic and emphasized 
the ethical truth embodied in the ordinary life of the people. The literature of 
Young Germany was most strongly represented in the dramatic and essayistic 
genres; that of Biedermeier in poetry and the Novelle. Despite their differences, 
both these movements suggest an analogy between the role of literature and 
religion in the culture of early nineteenth-century Germany. 
Several leading thinkers of the age both identify the time around 1830 as 
the end of the Romantic period in German literature and link that ending to an 
analogy between aesthetic and religious consciousness in German culture as a 
whole. By far the most important philosophical and theological influence on the 
literature of the age, especially the movement known as Young Germany, was 
the work of Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel interprets the end of Romanticism to 
mean both an end of religion and an end of art. For Hegel in his Vorlesungen 
über die Philosophie der Ästhetik (Lectures on the Philosophy of Fine Art, 
1831) the immediate consciousness of truth, once culturally present in religious 
form, has now been supplanted—but in the Hegelian idiom still preserved 
(‘aufgehoben’)—by the fully self-conscious and reflective truth which is the 
work of philosophy.4 This suggests an analogy between the fates of literature 
and religion in modernity. In his Vorlesungen Über die Philosophie der 
Religion (Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 1831) Hegel argues that in the 
modern world, religion, like art, must necessarily be superseded by the fully 
self-conscious mode of insight which is philosophy. Religion, Hegel argues, 
communicates truth in the mode of representation (‘Vorstellung’): a form of 
consciousness which points to a truth beyond itself.5 His theology is 
emphatically centred upon the person of Christ, because for Hegel the historical 
contingency of the Incarnation is the source of both theological and 
philosophical truth. Philosophy can be the self-consciousness of modernity only 
because it is the consciousness of Spirit itself which has become really and 
actually historical in the event of the Incarnation.6 But our faith in that event 
cannot depend on philosophical argument (although of course it may partially 
be enabled by philosophical insight) nor on the empirical demonstration of 
particular historical facts. Rather it is the upshot of the belief of the Christian 
                                                          
4 G.W.F.Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, 3 vols., in Hegel, Werke, ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl 
Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1970), vol. XIII, pp. 23-5. 
5 Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, in Werke, vol. XVI, pp. 139-51. 
6  Hegel, ibid., vol. XVII, p. 274. 
community (‘Gemeinde’) throughout history, who know because of Pentecost 
that it is their Spirit which witnesses to the Spirit of Truth. However, that Spirit, 
in Hegel’s age and that of his readers, will be informed by post-Idealist and 
therefore Hegelian philosophy as much as by the life of the Church (Hegel’s 
term Gemeinde embraces both the whole community of believers and the 
philosophically informed community of faith).7 Therefore the difference, even 
the conflict, between the self-conscious insight of philosophy and the truth of 
Christian experience has in modernity become an inescapable moment of faith 
itself.  
This perspective, in the generation after Hegel’s death in 1831, gave rise 
to a powerful radical movement in theology which also had a generic cultural 
and political influence. The exponents of this movement are often known as the 
Left (or young) Hegelians and include theologians like Bruno Bauer (1809-
1882), Max Stirner (1806-1856) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872). This 
group interpreted Hegel’s theology as a summons to radical political and social 
reform. The key theme of these writers is the distance, indeed the contradiction, 
between the often theologically inflected discourse of German intellectual life in 
the early-nineteenth century and the actual reality which that discourse claims to 
reflect.  They therefore aim, employing a discourse which itself constantly but 
ironically invokes the language of theology, to promote the intellectual and 
practical desacralization of their culture. Karl Gutzkow’s (1811-1878) best 
known novel Wally die Zweiflerin (Wally the Doubter, 1835) has the most far-
fetched of plots but is most relevant to our theme. An aristocratic intellectual 
woman with a theological and philosophical education (the portrayal of such a 
character in the Germany of the 1830s was a provocation in itself) is forced into 
an arranged marriage with the Sardinian ambassador. She eventually leaves her 
husband after a honeymoon in Paris to be with her erstwhile lover Cäsar, only to 
                                                          
7  On this point, see Nicholas Boyle, Sacred and Secular Scriptures: A Catholic Approach to Literature 
(London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2004), pp. 61-2. 
commit suicide after her lover fails to assuage his religious doubts which are 
expressed in his fictional treatise Geständnisse über Religion und Christentum 
(‘Confessions about Religion and Christianity’). The improbable nature of the 
plot—which will strike most modern readers as psychologically incredible— 
reflects the unreality of the world which the novel evokes. However, it is 
precisely the alienation of the cultural world its characters inhabit from any real 
world of experience which is the novel’s real theme. None of the discourses 
available to them (whether philosophical, theological, or otherwise) is able to 
overcome it. The heroine’s despair is not the consequence of any new form of 
theological doubt. Wally records in her diaries her reading of Lessing’s 
Reimarusfragmente (Fragments attributed to Reimarus, 1774),8 published sixty 
years before Gutzkow’s novel and positing the radical distinction between the 
written content of the Biblical text and theological truth which is the premise of 
all post-Kantian theology. This distinction finds its classic theological 
expression in David Friedrich Strauss’s (1808-1874) Das Leben Jesu (The Life 
of Jesus, 1835),9 published in the same year as Gutzkow’s novel, which finally 
ratifies this position with a wealth of Biblical scholarship but does not 
fundamentally change it. Her lover Cäsar’s theological testament in his 
Confessions also adds nothing new to the conclusions of Idealist theology and 
the source criticism of the Bible, but rather makes explicit their implications. 
Any attempt to found Christian theology in the historical veracity of the Gospel 
accounts alone risks making faith itself dependent on a historically contingent 
and therefore fallible text. The heroine’s suicide is not a consequence of her 
                                                          
8 These fragments, based on a partial draft of Hermann Samuel Reimarus’s Apologie oder Schutzschrift der 
Vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes (Apology or Essay in Defence of the Rational Worshippers of God) and followed 
by a commentary by Lessing (‘Gegensätze des Herausgebers’) (‘Critical Commentary by the Editor’) are the 
classic post-Enlightenment Protestant expression of the independence of theological interpretation from the 
literal content of the Biblical text. See Lessing, Werke, ed. by Helmut Gröbel et al., 7 vols (München: Carl 
Hanser , 1976), vol. VII, pp. 312-476, especially p. 458f. 
9 For a good general survey of the influence of Strauss’s Life of Jesus in nineteenth-century Germany, especially 
in relation to Gutzkow’s Wally the Skeptic, see Marilyn Chaplin Massey, Christ Unmasked: The Meaning of The 
Life of Jesus in German Politics (Chapel Hill, NC and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 
pp. 57-80. 
introduction to these doctrines themselves. It is the outcome of her reflection 
about and therefore her reaction to them: that is to say, her attempt to connect 
them to her life. It is this connection, which neither she nor her culture can 
make, that provokes in her what Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) called ‘eine 
kräftige Reaktion von Seiten des Lebens’ (‘a powerful reaction from the side of 
life’).10 This is a reaction which in her case leads to despair and ultimately 
suicide. But it is not theology (neither the fictional theology of the text nor the 
actual theologies which Gutzkow’s fictional treatise broadly reflects) which 
produces that reaction. It is the inability of its adherents to connect that 
theological discourse to life. The last words of the treatise sum up the problem:  
 
Wir werden keinen neuen Himmel und keine neue Erde haben; aber die Brücke 
zwischen beiden, scheint es, muß von neuem gebaut werden.11  
 
We cannot have a new heaven and a new earth; but it seems as if the bridge 
between the two must be built anew 
 
Heinrich Heine’s (1797-1856) response to the end of Romanticism and 
the crisis of faith is more complex and expressed as much in poetry as in 
cultural critique. For Heine, in Elementargeister (Elemental Spirits, 1837), a 
critical account of Germanic and classical mythology, the living religion of 
paganism ends when the ancient Greek deities are reinterpreted by philosophers 
as the symbolic personae of myth. For Heine, the same is happening in his time 
with the historical and philosophical deconstruction of the received content of 
Christian doctrine. Heine suggests that the secret religion of Germany is 
pantheism: the aesthetic transposition of the truth once expressed by religion 
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Manfred Schröter (München: C.H.Beck, 1959 [1927]), vol. VI, p. 755.   
11  Gutzkow, Wally die Zweiflerin (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1998; first published 1835), p. 124. 
into the symbolic articulation of secular life. However, for Heine, this 
transposition also means that religious myths and symbols no longer betoken 
the reality of transcendence, but rather its absence. The ‘truth’ of religion can 
and must be expressed in the reinterpretation of its symbolic language as a 
critique of secular life.12 His two essays on the legacy of German literature and 
philosophy, Die romantische Schule (The Romantic School, 1835) and Zur 
Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland (On the History of 
Religion and Philosophy in Germany, 1835), argue that the accumulated 
intellectual energy of German Idealist philosophy (itself predicated on a 
philosophical reinterpretation of the Christian Revelation) and the symbolic 
resources of Germanic and Christian mythology can and must now be harnessed 
in the service of cultural critique and political revolution.  
For Heine, it is precisely the distance between the truth once expressed by 
religion and the Romantic form of art and its actual cultural expression which 
makes the reinterpretation of religion and art as myth a radical political as well 
as cultural act. This reinterpretation also means an ending: the end of the 
Romantic form of art as an integral expression of German culture and therefore 
the end of religion as an autonomous symbolic language and cultural force, 
capable of sustaining a popular religious sensibility or an intellectually 
defensible creed on the part of its cultivated adherents. Much of Heine’s early 
work suggests an antithesis between the energy of classical mythology and the 
modern manifestation of Christianity: what in his poem Die Götter 
Griechenlands (The Gods of Greece, 1826) (I/I, 417) ‘die neuen, herrschenden, 
tristen Götter’ (‘the new, ruling, sad gods’) he calls the religion of modernity 
which has ceased to be a living tradition. However his later work, especially his 
autobiographical Geständnisse (Confessions, 1854), suggests a more complex 
view of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. There Heine suggests that the natural 
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consequence of the decay of faith is the transformation of its content into a form 
of social and political prophecy, which retains the subjective energy whilst 
negating the objective content of Christian belief. He sees this development as a 
natural consequence of the fate of Protestantism which is the major cultural 
idiom of Germany in his time. Because it is the religion of the word, indeed the 
text, not the symbol or the sacrament, Protestant Christianity for Heine 
necessarily tends to the deconstruction of its symbolic expression and indeed— 
because of its dependence on scripture and the cultural centrality of the 
Lutheran Bible—of its metaphysical expression. In a series of fascinating 
aperçus he relates the German ‘religion of the word’ to the Jewish mistrust of 
representation which he links to the politically prophetic humanism which his 
work embodies (XV, 44-47). 
The second major literary reaction to the process of secularization in 
German culture and society between 1830 and 1848 was very different: the 
movement known as Biedermeier. For Heine, the secularization of religion and 
mythology meant the desacralization of the world. For neo-Romantic 
philosophers like Friedrich Schlegel, Catholic cultural critics like Joseph Görres 
(1776-1848) and the classicist and anthropologist Friedrich Creuzer (1771-
1858), it meant the opportunity for its resacralization. In his philosophical novel 
Lucinde (1799) Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) had defined modern poetry as 
one of ‘becoming’, not embodied presence.13 But this is the consequence of the 
disappearance of the ‘mythical’ mode of life and the alienation of human 
subjectivity which is its consequence. The task of modern art must therefore be 
to recreate a mythology appropriate to the modern age: a symbolic narrative by 
which the longing for the transcendent can be realized in the life of the people. 
For philologists and historians of the folk tradition like Jacob (1785-1863) and 
Wilhelm (1786-1859) Grimm, the very enterprise of philology—the explication 
                                                          
13  See Friedrich Schlegel, Lucinde, in Friedrich Schlegel: Kritische Ausgabe seiner Werke, ed. by Ernst Behler, 
35 vols, vol. II, pp. 182-83.  See also August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845), ‘Über Literatur, Kunst und Geist 
des Zeitalters’ (‘On literature, Art and the Spirit of the Age’, 1803) in Text und Kritik, 143 (1999), 3-11. 
of words and the Word—is grounded in the unity of the real and spiritual worlds 
to which myths and their symbolism witness. The Grimm brothers attempt to 
create a new form of popular mythology for the German people through the 
collection and commentary of folk tales (‘Märchen’), which are concerned with 
inner psychological, indeed unconscious experience, and yet, it was argued, 
could together with the retrieval of the symbolism of the ancient Germanic 
religion contribute to the creation of a kind of national mythology for the 
German people. For Friedrich Creuzer, professor of Classical Philology at 
Göttingen, whose Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker (Symbolism and 
Mythology of the Ancient Peoples, 1810-12) was highly influential in the fifty 
years after its publication, there was no intrinsic break between the mythology 
of ancient Greece and the sacramental symbolism of Christianity: one was the 
fulfilment of the other. The key medium of religious truth was not the word, but 
the symbol, the power of which consists in its ability to sum up an entire 
theology in one potent image. A symbol cannot be invented; it is inherent in the 
archetypal structure of myth14.  
For this second group, German literature can now become the cultural 
ally of faith because literature can contribute to the life of faith an immediate 
relationship to the world of common experience and a capacity to reveal the 
religious symbolism implicit in that world. For this movement, art is potentially 
connected to religion not because it reflects the truth of human subjectivity, but 
because it subordinates reflection to disclosure. This second response to 
secularization finds it most effective literary expression not in the novel or the 
drama, but in the poetry of writers like Clemens von Brentano (1778-1842) and 
Eduard Mörike (1804-1875) and the beginnings of the Novelle, which was to 
become a key form throughout the German-speaking lands by the middle of the 
nineteenth-century. Some Biedermeier poetry, for example the work of the 
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Catholic poets Clemens von Brentano (1778-1842), especially Das bittere 
Leiden unseres Herrn Jesus Christus (The Bitter Passion of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ, 1833) and Annette von Droste Hülhoff (1797-1848), especially Das 
Geistliche Jahr (The Christian Year, 1820) is overtly devotional. More apposite 
to our overall theme is the work of Eduard Mörike (a Lutheran pastor trained at 
the Tübingen theological college known as the Tübinger Stift and who 
corresponded extensively with David Friedrich Strauss), steeped in Biblical 
symbolism and the intellectual concerns of contemporary Protestant theology. 
Mörike’s poetry is often focused on the imagery of rural life and the 
Christian practice of the German peasantry, but often suggests less an external 
natural order than a symbolic world undermined from within by a distinctly 
modern doubt, in which subjective consciousness and the objective criteria of 
truth are only precariously related. However, there is a constant tension in his 
poetry between the apprehension of a desacralized world and the continued 
presence of a Christian hope. His great poem Die Elemente (The Elements, 
1838), for example, is prefaced by the Greek text of Romans 8:19: 
 
‘For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the 
sons of God’. 
 
The next two verses are essential to its context: 
 
20: ‘For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of 
him who hath subjected the same in hope’. 
21: ‘Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of 
corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God’. 
 
The Pauline verses suggest the Christian doctrine of justification freely offered 
in Christ and to which the Christian response can only be faith as the fruit of 
grace. But the verse quoted at the head of the poem and the following one links 
this affirmation to both the Incarnation and the Fall. For the subjection of the 
‘creature’ (the condition of humanity in the unredeemed natural world) is the 
necessary condition for the free gift of grace: the objective correlative of the real 
apprehension that redemption can never be the fruit of our fulfilment of the law. 
The title of the poem also suggests Galatians 4: 3-5, which speak of the 
childhood of humanity as ‘bondage under the elements of the world’ and mature 
human freedom as redemption from the law by the coming of Christ and the gift 
of the spirit. In Mörike’s poem, however, there is no direct reference to 
redemption from the law or the glorious liberty of the children of God which is 
its outcome. The first part of the poem introduces a giant (‘der Riese’) who is 
also ‘master of the elements’ (‘der Elemente Meister’) and ‘Lord of the fatal 
power’ (‘Herr der tödlichen Gewalt’). Yet this power over nature is given to the 
Master by a ‘god’: 
 
Er heißt der Elemente Meister, 
Heißt Herr der tödtlichen Gewalt; 
Ein Gott hat sie ihm übergeben. 
Ach!, die schmerzensreiche Lust.15 
 
He is called Master of the elements 
Lord of the fatal power 
A god has given it to him 
Oh! What pleasure full of pain. 
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The power of the Master suggests both the alien power of natural force or even 
violence (‘Gewalt’) and human alienation from the world as the empire of that 
power: 
 
Die weißen Nebel auf der Wiese 
Sind Wassergeister aus dem Meer: 
Ihrem Gebieter nachgezogen 
Vergiften sie die reine Nacht 
 
The white mists on the meadow 
Are water-spirits from the sea 
Following their master 
They poison the pure night 
 
Only gradually does the poem enter the semantic field of Christianity and then 
only obliquely, when the giant or the Master is said to follow ‘in restless rage’ 
(‘rastlos wüthend’) the terrible trace of a divinity (‘der Gottheit grauenvolle 
Spur’). The Lord of the elements is said to be both a quasi-divine being in 
control of nature and to have a noble and implicitly human heart which breaks 
because it is alienated from the world which it seeks to control: 
 
Da will das edle Herz zerreißen 
Da sieht er schrecklich sich allein; 
Und doch kann er sich nicht würdig heißen 
Mit Göttern ganz ein Gott zu sein (I, 214 et seq.) 
 
Then the noble heart would break 
In terror he sees himself alone 
Yet he cannot call himself worthy 
To be a god among gods 
 
The modulation of this state of alienation into a more creative consciousness is 
heralded by the appearance of one of the most resonant words in the Romantic 
(and now post-Romantic) vocabulary—‘Sehnsucht’ (‘longing’)—which in its 
German form also suggests compulsive desire (‘Sucht’). The master’s capacity 
to feel longing is said to bring down chains from heaven ‘as if they might rescue 
him’: 
 
Da hängen ungeheure Ketten 
Aus finsterem Wolkenraum herab, 
Dran er, als müßten sie ihn retten, 
Sich zwingt zum Himmel auf und ab 
 
There monstrous chains  
Hang down from the firmament 
On which, as if they were to rescue him 
He forces himself to move between heaven and earth 
 
The monstrous chains let down from heaven seem to promise redemption only 
in the subjunctive and therefore analogical mode (‘als müssten sie ihn retten’). 
The possibility becomes real when two angel-like figures appear at the head of 
the chains: 
 
Dort weilen rosige Gestalten 
In heitern Höhen, himmlisch klar, 
Und fort am goldnen Ringe halten 
Sie schwesterlich das Kettenpaar. 
 
There rose-like forms 
Dwell in the blissful heights, clear as heaven 
Bearing as if on a golden ring 
Like sisters his chains 
 
Their prayer (implicitly for the Master) is said to enable his feeling to release or 
dissolve itself in a moment of liberation: 
 
Und wie sie im Gebete glühen, 
Löst, wie ein Traum, sich sein Gefühl 
 
And as they glow in prayer 
His heart, as if in a dream, becomes free  
 
But this release is less a release from the Master’s previous condition than a 
liberation which enables him to assent to it, which the Master is now able to see 
from a transfigured perspective: 
 
O folge harmlos deiner Weise 
Dazu Allvater dich erkor! 
Dein Wort von Anfang mußt du trauen 
In ihm laß deinen Willen sein (I, 215 et seq.) 
 
Oh follow, free from harm, your path 
For which the Almighty has chosen you 
You must trust the Word given you in the beginning 
Let your will rest there 
 
The ‘redemption’ of the Master is more an acceptance of transfiguration than a 
conversion of his natural being. This insight is indeed the fruit of intercessory 
prayer (‘Gebet’) which leads him to an almost Faustian fulfilment of natural 
knowledge which, however, is the upshot of the longing (‘Sehnsucht’) produced 
by alienation from the natural order. After the intercession, and by his 
intercessor, the Master is addressed as ‘Du’: 
 
Wirst schauen… 
Wie in des Sturmes dunklen Falten 
Des Vaters göttlich Wesen schwebt 
Den Faden freundlicher Gewalten 
Das Band geheimer Eintracht webt 
 
You will see… 
How in the dark depths of the storm 
Hovers the divine being of the Father 
Weaving together the bond of secret harmony 
 
The object of the address shifts to future and more enlightened generations: 
 
Einst wird es kommen, daß auf Erden 
Sich höhere Geschlechter freun. 
 
At last the time will come on earth 
When transfigured generations will delight  
 
In the last stanza of the poem the elements (‘die Elemente’) are mentioned for 
the second time and said to be ‘reconciled to God’ (‘gottversöhnt’) and so no 
longer the object of the Master’s domination. Only at the end of the poem does 
the Thou (‘Du’) by which the Master is addressed become the ‘we’ of an 
implicitly Christian community who are said to walk in the light and to be the 
precondition of the Master’s new insight: 
 
Mit lichtem Blick steigst Du nach Oben 
Denn in der Klarheit wandeln wir. 
 
With a lighted vision you will rise on high 
For we walk in the light 
 
Mörike’s work is nourished by two equally potent sources: his poetic creativity 
and his vocation as a Christian minister. In this poem both energies are 
undoubtedly present and yet in uneasy tension. The deliverance of the ‘creature’ 
alluded to in Mörike’s epigraph and the subjection of the creature to vanity 
which is its theological precondition do indeed lead to that future transfiguration 
of all human knowledge (‘Denn in der Klarheit wandeln wir’) which is the 
Pauline and Christian hope. However, the ‘we’ of the Christian community or 
‘Gemeinde’ appears only in the poem’s last word. The ‘Du’ addressed by the 
angelic intercessors is still (albeit transfigured) the natural man who first relates 
to the world only as Master. He remains the subject of the poetic narrative 
throughout. His transfiguration does not involve a ‘conversion’—a turning away 
or against— the elements of the natural order, but rather a changed 
apprehension of those same elements, which at the end of the poem have been 
reconciled to God. Mörike’s Master, like Hegel’s Master in the famous section 
of the Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind, 1807) entitled 
‘Herrschaft und Knechtschaft’ (‘Lordship and Bondage’)16 learns by 
experience—especially the experience of alienation and therefore longing 
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(‘Sehnsucht’)—that the dominating consciousness must necessarily alienate 
itself from the truth of being. But this insight is not in theological terms truly the 
product of revelation, especially not the Lutheran moment of conversion which 
implies a total disjunction of natural from theological knowledge. The truly 
theological ‘Master’ of nature (the ‘Lord of lethal force’ of whom there is no 
equal in this world) persists until the end of eschatological time, although he has 
been definitively judged by the Word of God in Christ.17 In Mörike’s poem it is 
the Master himself who attains insight: a changed understanding of nature, 
which remains the locus of truth—not the domain of the Prince of this World—
at the end of the poem as it was at the beginning. 
For Mörike, neither the orthodox Lutheran insistence on the primacy of 
scriptural revelation as the vehicle of conversion, nor the actual Christian 
congregation or ‘Gemeinde’ as the paradigm of Christ’s kingdom on earth, can 
in themselves be the locus of salvation. Rather, that congregation must be 
subsumed into the wider community of philosophically aware men and women 
of goodwill, informed both by the Lutheran tradition of worship and a 
theological tradition—epitomized by Strauss’s Life of Jesus—which insists on 
the reinterpretation of the received deposit of faith in both historical and 
philosophical terms. That second community—which is precisely what Hegel 
meant by the Christian community (‘Gemeinde’) to whom the spirit speaks—is 
in the public domain only tenuously related to the first. Yet both (as Mörike’s 
work so powerfully shows) can be immediately present in the experience of a 
single individual.  
 These very different reactions by German writers to the end of 
Romanticism in Germany share one significant common feature. All three relate 
the fate of art (especially literature) to that of religion in the modern age. All 
argue that the process through which German and European culture has become 
radically self-conscious—the undermining of immediate, culturally embodied 
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and symbolically represented modes of truth by the fully self-conscious mode of 
philosophy—both limits and yet emphasizes the truth communicated by both 
religion and literature. Both religion and literature are now limited because they 
can no longer communicate the whole truth of human culture in what is 
perceived to be an intellectually adequate form. At the end of the Romantic age 
in nineteenth-century Germany, both literature and religion are therefore in a 
significant sense both partial and opposing expressions of German culture as a 
whole. However, in that same culture, both religion and literature are also 
emphasized, because the very dissociation of religious and literary truth from 
cognitive knowledge betokens a cultural lack: a need for a mode of truth which 
now cannot be reduced to its conceptual articulation and yet remains necessary 
for the vitality and integrity of culture as a whole.  
This double and dialectical relationship between ‘literary’ and ‘religious’ 
consciousness in nineteenth-century German writing suggests that any crude 
distinction between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ reactions to the legacy of 
Romanticism in German culture is potentially misleading. A prime example is 
the work of Georg Büchner (1813-1837) especially his great Novelle Lenz 
(1835), in which the language of Christianity has conflicting and yet often 
simultaneous meanings. That language both really articulates and yet sometimes 
obscures the experience of Büchner’s central character. The story is loosely 
based on the experience of the eighteenth-century writer Jakob Michael Lenz 
(1751-1792), who seeks refuge during a period of mental distress in the home of 
Pastor Oberlin, the Lutheran minister in the village of Waldersbach in the 
Vosges. However, Büchner’s narrative technique—a masterly employment of 
the technique of free indirect speech, through which the experience of his 
protagonist is shown from the inside and the outside at once—rapidly transports 
the reader into the literary, philosophical and theological world of early 
nineteenth-century Germany of which Büchner was a part. The reader’s initial 
impression of Lenz is of a literary and philosophical ‘realist’ whose way of 
seeing the world is directly related to identification with ordinary people and 
their concerns. What Lenz most abjures is any form of aesthetic or 
philosophical dualism:  the idea that there is a higher form of truth which might 
be supposed to transfigure or redeem the truth of ordinary experience. Lenz’s 
aesthetic standpoint is related to a social and theological sensibility: a love for 
the simplest or most ‘prosaic’ people under the sun (‘die prosaischsten 
Menschen unter der Sonne’) such as the peasant girls he sees around him at 
Waldersbach.18 Such people embody infinite beauty (‘eine unendliche 
Schönheit’). This aesthetic sensibility is for Büchner’s character Lenz 
profoundly Christian, as is evidenced by his later reference to two paintings of 
the Dutch masters: one of Christ meeting the disciples on the road to Emmaus; 
the other of an elderly woman, unable to attend church, reading the Biblical text 
at home with the village church visible through an open window (I, 235).19 For 
Lenz, this way of seeing reality is inseparable from his way of feeling and 
acting in it. Both involve identification with the life of the people who embody 
and communicate both theological and aesthetic truth. It is this identification 
which leads him to accept Pastor Oberlin’s invitation to preach in the church at 
Waldersbach, an experience which is said to make him at one both with himself 
and the congregation (I, 231 et seq.): 
 
Ein süßes Gefühl unendlichen Wohls beschlich ihn. Er sprach einfach mit den 
Leuten, sie litten alle mit ihm. 
 
He was overcome by a sweet feeling of infinite wellbeing. He spoke simply 
with the people, they all suffered with him. 
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zur deutschen Literatur vom 18. bis 20. Jahrhundert (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1974), pp. 108, 110. 
 For Büchner’s character Lenz, it is the experience of human suffering, not 
philosophical speculation or political critique, which is the touchstone of 
theological truth. In the words of the hymn he sings with the congregation at 
Waldersbach: 
 
Laß in mir die heil’gen Schmerzen, 
Tiefe Brunnen ganz aufbrechen; 
Leiden sei all mein Gewinst, 
Leiden sei mein Gottesdienst. 
 
Let the blessed pains, 
Open deep fountains in me; 
Let suffering be all gain, 
Suffering my Divine Service. 
 
But Büchner’s character Lenz is not the author of Büchner’s Lenz. Büchner’s 
narrative realism shows us that what, for his character Lenz, is a subjectively 
real connection between a way of seeing and a way of feeling and acting in the 
world is not for that reason objectively real. For the mental standpoint which 
enables him to reject Idealism, which he calls ‘die schmählichste Verachtung 
der menschlichen Natur’ (the most shameful contempt for human nature), is 
itself, in philosophical and theological terms, profoundly Idealist. The view of 
the world which Lenz says enables him to capture reality (‘Wirklichkeit’) is a 
vision of reality in theological terms, in which all experience is incarnate Being 
because it is created by God. 
 
Der liebe Gott hat die Welt wohl gemacht wie sie sein soll, und wir können 
wohl nicht was Besseres klecksen. (I, 234) 
 God has made the world as it ought to be and we can’t improve on his creation. 
 
This conviction, entirely compatible with a theologically and politically 
‘conservative’ reading of Hegelian Idealism, as well as the idea that art can 
fulfil the role once played by religious symbolism and sacramental faith, is for 
Lenz the source of both his aesthetic and his theological vision. But it cannot be 
so for us, Büchner’s readers, for whom the truth of Lenz’s experience is 
mediated by Büchner’s narrative realism. For what that realism shows us is that 
this consciousness, which is for Lenz fleetingly real during the church service at 
Waldersbach, or when he meets the peasants of the Vosges and discusses art 
with Oberlin’s friend Kaufmann, is radically negated by Lenz’s experience as a 
whole. For this total vision, mediated initially by Lenz’s experience of fellow 
feeling with the parishioners at Waldersbach and sustained by his experience of 
what he sees both among them and in the paintings of the Dutch masters, is 
shattered almost as soon as it appears. Initially, Lenz’s empathy with the 
congregation in the village church—his identification with the suffering of 
others—is not incompatible with his own suffering as a particular individual, or 
even with the existential isolation which his intensely personal vision produces. 
Indeed, one is the source of the other, because his sudden realization, after the 
church service, that he is radically alone brings about ‘a quiet, deep sympathy 
with himself’ (‘ein leises tiefes Mitleid mit sich selbst’) (I, 232). The very fact 
that he can feel the suffering which comes from his isolation is itself the 
redemption of it:  
 
Er war allein, allein! Da rauschte die Quelle, Ströme brachen aus seinen Augen 
[…] es war ihm als müsse er sich auflösen, er konnte kein Ende finden der 
Wollust. (I, 231) 
 
He was alone, alone! Then the well began to flow, floods of tears streamed from 
his eyes […] it was as if he could only dissolve himself, his joy could not cease. 
 
However, by the end of the narrative Lenz has ceased to feel at all and his 
intellectual lucidity does not - as it did in the middle of the story - accompany 
and sustain his capacities to feel and to act. Indeed it seems to negate both:  
 
Er schien ganz vernünftig, sprach mit den Leuten; er tat Alles wie die Anderen 
taten, es war aber eine entsetzliche Leere in ihm, er fühlte keine Angst mehr, 
kein Verlangen; sein Dasein war ihm eine notwendige Last. – So lebte er hin. (I, 
250) 
 
He seemed quite reasonable and spoke with the people; he did everything as 
others did, but there was a terrible emptiness in him, he had no more anxiety, no 
more desire, his existence was no more than a necessary burden to him. He 
continued to live like that.  
 
In his finally impoverished condition, his suffering (‘Leiden’) is no longer real 
because it is not the source of human feeling or religious communion. On the 
contrary, his capacity for true suffering has become unreal because his real 
‘suffering’ is now his inability to feel anything at all, to the extent that he tries 
to cause himself physical harm in order to make himself truly suffer (‘es war 
[…] ein Versuch, sich zu sich zu bringen durch physischen Schmerz’ (ibid)). 
What had once, for Lenz, been a vision of the world as an aesthetic and 
theological order, to which he is meaningfully related even in his most extreme 
isolation, now becomes the opposite: a total dissociation of subjective 
experience from objective truth.  
The power of Büchner’s realism in Lenz is to show us how this can really 
happen. In so doing, he shows us what his character Lenz can never perceive. 
That is that philosophical and therefore theological Idealism, when dissociated 
from any real personal or social experience, must necessarily be at odds with 
any real personal faith: that is to say, a faith which is conscious of the difference 
as well as the connection between contingent and absolute truth, actual 
experience and philosophical contemplation. This is the experience of 
Büchner’s whole literary generation, though differently manifested in its 
conservative and radical wings. In this text, the theological problematic is most 
manifest when Lenz visits a cottage in the neighbouring village of Fouday 
where a child has died and Lenz, echoing the biblical story of Christ’s 
resuscitation of a child (Mark 2: 9) attempts to revive the child with the words 
‘Steh auf und Wandle!’ (Stand up and walk!) (I, 242) This episode, which 
precipitates Lenz’s final descent into insanity, is theologically significant in 
Büchner’s text not because of the problem of the historicity of the Gospel 
narrative which it seems to suggest. It is so because of the way it connects that 
problem to actual experience. After 1830 German Protestant intellectuals had 
long since ceased to believe that what Lessing nearly sixty years earlier had 
called ‘zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten’ (contingent truths of history) could 
prove the ‘notwendige Vernunftwahrheiten’ (necessary rational truths) of 
Christian doctrine.20 But the necessary consequence of that dissociation—that a 
faith which has become dependent upon philosophical theology can and must 
now be borne out only through the witness of personal experience and the actual 
community of faith in which that experience might arise—has hardly been 
realized. That is to say, in early nineteenth-century Germany a process of 
secularization has taken place in philosophical theology which has no real 
equivalent in the wider society, which remains permeated by the symbolic, 
semantic and cultural idiom of Christian belief. Büchner’s achievement in Lenz 
is to highlight the consequences of that objective deconstruction of Christian 
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belief in the subjective experience of his character Lenz, who is a representative 
figure of his age.  
 
 
II Religion and the Emergence of German Realism 1850-1871 
Büchner’s Lenz is an exceptionally revealing case of a paradox implicit in much 
of early nineteenth-century literature in the German-speaking world. The 
religious dimension in that literature can express both a distance from what are 
normally considered the social and cultural attributes of the modern world 
and—by the same token—an especially acute critique of some of the 
characteristics of modernity which German literature remarkably anticipates. 
That paradoxical capacity also means that literary realism—especially the 
realist novel—emerges in the German-speaking world later and in a different 
way from the rest of Europe. In the mid-nineteenth narrative realism first 
develops in the German-speaking world not in the realist novel, but in the 
shorter but often most powerful form of the Novelle, especially outside 
Germany in Austria and Switzerland (the outstanding German exceptions are 
Mörike, Annette von Droste Hülshoff and Büchner). 
In the work of the Austrian Catholic Adalbert Stifter (1805-68) a 
profoundly religious sensibility combines with a remarkable modernity of 
theme and technique. In his aesthetic theory, Stifter combines an Idealist 
aesthetic with a theological ontology to suggest that the purpose of art is to act 
as the aesthetic vehicle of Revelation. He asserts that the purpose of art is at 
once aesthetic and theological: to disclose, or enable the reader to see, the most 
truly ‘real’ form of reality: ‘die wirklichste Wirklichkeit’.21 Stifter introduces 
his best-known collection of Novellen, Bunte Steine (Bright Stones, 1853), with 
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a preface in which he argues that there is a gentle law (‘sanftes Gesetz’)22 which 
recognizes and protects the rights of the individual in an ethically ordered 
community. This, together with Stifter’s preference for rural, provincial and 
historical themes and a marked absence of dramatic action in his narratives, has 
led some critics to see his work as an apology for a static order in politics as in 
art. Many of Stifter’s Novellen—for example Bergkristall (Mountain Crystal), 
about two children rescued from an Austrian mountainside on Christmas Eve, 
and Kalkstein (Limestone), about the selfless service in a remote country district 
of an impoverished parish priest—do indeed outwardly suggest an agrarian 
society held together by the practice and cultural expression of the Catholic 
faith and a psychological and social realism which reflects the operation of a 
‘gentle law’ in human life.’ 
However, Stifter’s apparently simple narratives can have challenging, 
even disturbing depths; the moral and theological vision they embody is often 
far from monolithic, and far from reassuring. In Limestone, for example, an 
impoverished and saintly priest, once destined for an academic career, dedicates 
his life to work in the deprived and desolate limestone region known as the 
Steinkar. In one of Stifter’s characteristic Rahmenerzählungen (‘framework  
narrations’) a scientifically trained surveyor meets the priest at a dinner in a 
more prosperous vicarage, notices some marked oddities in his behaviour and 
then encounters him again on a scientific expedition to the limestone district. It 
transpires that the priest’s most obviously neurotic, indeed infantile, symptom 
(the wearing of fine linen next to his body when he can scarcely afford normal 
clothing, and an obsessive pushing back of his undershirt under the cuffs of his 
threadbare jacket) betokens an unrequited adolescent love for the daughter of a 
neighbouring laundress who was similarly obsessed with the purity of the linen 
she washes. The self-mastery which the priest achieves and sublimates into a 
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life of charitable public service—in a central passage he is portrayed carrying 
children on his shoulders through the icy waters of a flood, an act which 
foreshadows the legacy of his life savings for the construction of a school—has 
been achieved at a terrible price. Self-suppression is not necessarily equal to 
renunciation, nor can the sublimation it seeks be anything more than fractured 
and partial. Neither, the actual course of Stifter’s narrative suggests, can the 
religious and ethical foundation on which civilization rests be anything more. 
Characteristically, however, the psychological realism and symbolism of the 
internal narration (the surveyor’s account of his encounter with the priest) is 
partially eclipsed by the external narrative framework, which consists of an 
initial discussion among friends about the relationship between the ‘higher’ and 
‘lower’ gifts of the soul (die Gaben der Seele’) (I, 55) and an ending which 
suggests that the origin of the ‘higher’ activity of the priest in the suppression of 
his ‘lower’ energies does not detract from his moral greatness. For that 
connection—the real story behind the single cross in the churchyard by which 
the priest is remembered—cannot be articulated (or, literally, seen) in actual 
life. It can only be shown by the power of Stifter’s realism because it can only 
be silently revealed in what we call reality. 
Stifter’s Novelle Turmalin (Jet) is more complex and directly questions 
the relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical (which in this case is 
implicitly also the religious) mode of consciousness. Jet differs from the other 
stories in the Bright Stones collection both in its context and its theme: the 
urban world of mid-nineteenth-century Vienna and a case of mental disturbance 
and the neglect and abuse of a child. This story, apparently so different from the 
others in the Bright Stones collection in its concern with the social and 
psychological conditions of modern life, does in fact directly address one of the 
central preoccupations of Stifter’s work: the truth embodied in ordinary human 
relationships and its capacity to redeem (the meaning here is both theological 
and social) someone alienated from the ‘normal’ life of society. 
The external context of the Novelle—the story of an eccentric Viennese 
rentier (‘Rentherr’)) deserted by his wife and living in a cellar with his mentally 
handicapped child—suggests an almost naturalistic concern with milieu. The 
beginning of the story, however, evokes a dark truth which is distant and 
unremembered not because it is distant in time or forgotten in the multiplicity of 
the urban space, but because it is the dark side of the soul. It is the mental 
alienation which occurs when subjectivity becomes detached from the 
commonly human world: 
 
Wie weit der Mensch kömmt, wenn er das Licht seiner Vernunft trübt […] sich 
unbedingt der Innigkeit seiner Freuden und Schmerzen hingibt, den Halt 
verliert, und in Zustände gerät, die wir uns kaum zu enträtseln wissen. (I, 119) 
 
How far a man can stray when he obscures the light of his reason […] abandons 
himself unconditionally to the pains and pleasures of his inner self, loses all 
restraint and falls into a condition which we can hardly fathom.  
 
The first part of the narrative is in the third person and describes the isolated life 
of a cultivated man of private means, whose dissociation from the world of 
productive work leads to a voluntary but then compulsive withdrawal from 
normal human interaction. The man has a mediocre talent in all the arts— music 
and poetry no less than painting—but his main occupation consists in looking at 
images and fantasizing about what they represent. His walls are occupied from 
top to bottom with the portraits of famous men, which he can observe from any 
angle with the aid of furniture fitted with rollers. The description of this state of 
affairs is suddenly interrupted by reference to the man’s wife and child, whose 
apparent normality heighten the reader’s sense of the rentier’s alienation. The 
description of the wife’s room closes with the first evocation in the story of an 
image with generally intelligible human significance, that of the Madonna and 
child.  
Soon the next key character is introduced: the actor Dall, who rapidly 
becomes the rentier’s friend. He is distinguished as an actor by the ability to 
project himself wholly into his roles, so that he becomes the character he is 
supposed to represent and the distinction between reality and its representation 
becomes blurred. By the same token, he never takes roles into which he cannot 
adequately project himself. This apparently total authenticity of aesthetic 
imagination is however matched by an equally total inability to commit himself 
fully to any person or social group. His lively imagination means that he is able 
to give to any human society a heightened sentimental tone. But he quits a 
social group as soon as it requires actual human commitment. He is therefore 
said to live in situations (‘Zuständen’) rather than relationships and to change 
them as soon as the fancy takes him (‘er lebte daher in Zuständen und verließ 
sie, wie es ihm beliebte’ (I, 124)). Eventually the actor seduces the rentier’s 
wife and soon afterwards leaves him alone with his daughter. It is his wife who 
first confesses the affair and the actor is said to have anticipated her conscience 
(‘Gewissen’) in doing so (I, 125). After an initial outbreak of rage he appears to 
be reconciled to the loss of his wife and to fall into an outwardly calm state (‘er 
sass ruhig und sinnend’(I, 126). Eventually he leaves his dwelling without legal 
formality and it is opened by the authorities: all is the same including the image 
of the Madonna, except that his own child has disappeared from its crib.  
This is the turning point of the Novelle, at which the story of the rentier is 
said to be forgotten before it is taken up several years later by a second internal 
narrator, a married woman who eventually discovers the whereabouts of the 
rentier and then cares for his child after his death. The rentier’s presence is first 
signalled to the woman by his playing of the flute which is as musically 
untutored as it is emotionally intense. Eventually she discovers that the man has 
been living in the cellar, and the building long since demolished, with his now 
physically handicapped daughter who is forced to care for him at home and 
whom he fails to educate. The rentier hangs himself, leaving the encephalitic 
daughter behind, whom the woman discovers to be—like her father—both 
formally intelligent and profoundly disturbed. Eventually the woman wins the 
trust of the child, who begins to recount the details of her dysfunctional 
existence with her father. Her relationship with her father, like her father’s own 
relationship with the images which constitute his world, seems to consist in a 
kind of looking without seeing. He repeatedly requires of her that she should 
describe the moment when he lies dead and buried in his coffin and when and 
how his wife will commit suicide in despair:  
 
Beschreibe den Augenblick, wenn ich tot auf der Bahre legen werde und wenn 
sie mich begraben […] wie deine Mutter von ihrem Herzen gepeinigt […] und 
wie sie in der Verzweiflung ihrem Leben ein Ende macht. (I, 152) 
 
Describe the moment when I will lie dead in my coffin and they bury me […] 
how your mother will suffer in her heart […] and how she will take her own life 
in despair.  
 
His consciousness of himself as really being in the world—like his 
consciousness of the world and of other—depends upon his representation of it. 
As he believes the world to be the object of his own representation, he must 
himself be represented—narrated—in order to be.   
 
The second half of this Novelle—perhaps Stifter’s greatest—is indeed 
concerned with the manifestation of that gentle law of humanity which is 
expressed in both love and knowledge. Through integration into the woman’s 
family and both practical and religious education the orphan girl is enters into a 
life both normal and humane, eventually caring for herself as she has been cared 
for. But how are we to interpret the story as a whole? The transition from the 
first to the second half of the story might be described as a movement from an 
aesthetic to an ethical mode of consciousness, in which a morbid subjectivity, 
which equates representation with being and so becomes estranged from the 
social and human world, is redeemed (at least in the next generation) by 
integration into a loving family and the dignity of simple, productive labour. 
The rentier’s false inwardness of self-contemplation and self-projection, in 
which he ‘abandons himself unconditionally to the pains and pleasures of his 
inner self’ (‘sich unbedingt der Innigkeit seiner Freuden und Schmerzen 
hingibt’) (I, 119) is succeeded in his daughter’s redeemed adulthood by a true 
inwardness and a stable personality, true to itself and yet integrated with others. 
The power of Stifter’s narrative certainly consists at least partially in its 
portrayal of this moral truth. Stifter’s narrative vision, it can be argued, is 
indeed one which sees, and sees through, a false world of subjective 
representation to a true phenomenology of experience: the embodiment of truth 
in everyday life. 
But what kind of truth—what ‘most truly real’ form of reality—is 
actually involved? At the level of actual experience the rentier’s life is certainly 
as real as that of the uneventful if virtuous and affectionate life of the 
conventional bourgeois family that cares for his daughter. The real question the 
posed by this Novelle is about the truth which is implicit in each mode of 
reality. Each mode of being can on its own terms be as coherent as the other. 
Stifter’s story does not depict any actual choice between them, but only the 
consequences of an implicit one in the rentier’s previous life. The two halves of 
the story show us two kinds of attitude to experience, but not the transition 
between them in a single self (the rentier’s daughter, who is prevented by her 
father from becoming a ‘self’, enters into self-conscious experience only in the 
second part of the story). It is therefore fitting that the only constant feature 
common to both halves is not a character but a symbol which can be seen: the 
image, both aesthetic and religious in import, of the Madonna and child, which 
is transferred from the child’s mother’s room in the rentier’s apartment into the 
child’s new home with the woman who cares for her. For Stifter, the Austrian 
Catholic, faith is not a subjective passion but an objective truth: a truth manifest 
in human society as well as nature which we can only recognize, not choose. 
The force of Stifter’s narrative therefore consists in its power to see and to show 
that truth, not as the consequence of inner decision but as embodied in ordinary 
experience: a truth which (as Jet shows so powerfully) is that of a fallen world: 
at one and the same time the context for both alienation and redemption.   
The first great realist novel in the German language—Gottfried Keller’s 
(1819-1890) Der grüne Heinrich (Green Henry, 1854)—was not written in 
Germany or Austria but in Switzerland. In German-speaking Switzerland the 
political self-definition of the citizens of a liberal republic is matched by a 
largely Protestant religious culture, closely linked through the Swiss tradition of 
popular education and political participation to engagement in the political 
public realm. In Switzerland too religious difference between Calvinist and 
Lutheran Protestantism and Catholicism is linked to an acceptance of religious 
pluralism and its expression in social and political terms. Gottfried Keller was 
closely familiar with the ideas of David Friedrich Strauss (the critical 
assimilation of the Biblical text in the light of modern historical and 
philosophical knowledge) and Ludwig Feuerbach (the understanding of 
religious belief as the projection of human feeling and relationships onto a 
spiritual realm, apparently but not really separate from that of human society).23 
However, for Keller, unlike his metropolitan German counterparts, those ideas 
offer a real and not just notional critique of the society of which he is a part: not 
just the critique of a discourse, but the exposure of a link between that discourse 
and the reality which it claims to represent. Keller’s reaction to the end of 
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Romanticism is neither ‘deconstructionist’—the attempt of the writers of Young 
Germany to use the Romantic discourse of religion as an ironic critique of the 
political and social reality which it claims to endorse—nor ‘reconstructionist’—
the attempt of the Biedermeier writers to recover in poetic form the content of 
religious symbolism now largely absent from actual practice. Realism, for 
Keller, is neither the negation nor the preservation of the Romantic mode, but 
its real poetic and critical successor.  
For Keller, both art and religion are modes of human consciousness 
which are to be understood primarily in social terms. Neither art nor religion 
can communicate an absolutely autonomous form of truth, higher or more 
significant than that expressed in human society. On the contrary, both art and 
religion, each in its own way, expresses the truth of society itself. The function 
of art—also in relation to religion—is both poetic and critical. It enables us 
imaginatively to understand religion as a social and cultural force, embodied 
and expressed in the life of the people. In Keller’s understanding, Feuerbach’s 
social and psychological view of religion is not reductive but imaginative—a 
kind of critical consciousness which imaginatively understands, without 
intellectually endorsing, religion as a mode of human experience. In a letter to 
his friend Wilhelm Baumgartner from Heidelberg in 1849, Keller remarks that 
what most impresses him is Feuerbach’s social and psychological critique of 
religion and its immediacy of empathetic understanding: 
 
Für mich ist die Hauptfrage die: Wird die Welt, wird das Leben prosaischer und 
gemeiner nach Feuerbach? Bis jetzt muß ich antworten: Nein! Im Gegenteil, es 
wird alles klarer, strenger, aber auch glühender und sinnlicher.24 
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For me the real question is this: Does the world, does life become baser and 
more prosaic after Feuerbach? So far I can only answer; No! On the contrary, 
everything will be clearer, more rigorous, but also brighter and more sensuous.  
 
This empathetic understanding is what connects Feuerbach’s theology to 
Keller’s art. In Green Henry it is manifest in Keller’s narrative of the growth of 
the young Heinrich Lee to social and psychological maturity. Heinrich imbibes 
the liberal-minded Protestantism of his father, which echoes the political and 
intellectual narrative of the Swiss Republic in its rejection at once of ultra-
montane Catholicism and the intolerant orthodoxy of the Reformed Church. He 
therefore willingly and even enthusiastically allows himself to be confirmed 
because of this connection but at the same time—at the moment of receiving 
communion—rejects any supernatural equivalent. His participation in the 
service and his rejection, on leaving the church, of its transcendental object, 
both reflect and enact the process of his growing up.  
This sense of the social objectivity of religious life, which in Keller’s 
work frequently finds expression in interior monologue or dialogue between 
characters, is thus accompanied by an equally effective psychological realism. It 
is highly significant that between the first (1854) and the final (1874) version of 
Green Henry Keller changes from the use in the earlier version of a mixed first 
and  third-person to a single first-person narrative—‘Ich’—in which a reflective 
narrative subject and the imaginary actual subject of Keller’s novel are 
combined. This enables Keller to combine a vision of reality from the 
standpoint of an individual consciousness growing to maturity and that of one 
who sees that individual consciousness against the broader canvas of a whole 
society. The adult narrator who discovers the Feuerbachian critique of religion 
as a student—and introduces some of the terms of that critique into the 
narration—is the same person as the boy Heinrich Lee, who comes to 
psychological and therefore spiritual adulthood in the particular environment of 
a Swiss village, mourning the death of his father and yet growing to maturity 
through intellectual and social intercourse with his fellows. What is most 
relevant to Keller’s narrator is not the abstractly objective truth of the growing 
boy’s developing consciousness of the religious sphere, but the dialectical truth 
of the interaction between the boy’s imagination and his environment. The child 
learns about God first from his mother’s spontaneous attempts to teach her son 
prayer, and then by association, when he hears the church bells at twilight and 
identifies the ‘Spirit’ of which his mother speaks with the weathercock on the 
church tower. He then rejects the cold abstraction of the school catechism in 
favour of his own inner life, in which nature around him and not the idea of God 
becomes the focus of his poetic imagination: 
 
Das Leben, die sinnliche Natur waren merkwürdigerweise mein Märchen, in 
dem ich meine Freude suchte, während Gott für mich zu der notwendigen, aber 
nüchternen und schulmeisterlichen Wirklichkeit wurde […] mit der ich so 
schnell fertig zu werden suchte als möglich.25 
 
Strangely enough life itself and sensuous nature was the fairy tale in which I 
sought delight, whilst God became for me the necessary, but sober and pedantic 
reality […] which I tried to handle as quickly as possible. 
 
Ultimately the reflective narrator concludes that his younger self did not truly 
love God, but needed the idea of God as a necessary stage in his psychological 
development: 
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Denn wenn ich recht scharf in jenen vergangenen dämmerhaften Seelenzustand 
zurückzudringen versuche, so entdecke ich noch wohl, daß ich den Gott meiner 
Kindheit nicht liebte, sondern nur brauchte. (Ibid.) 
 
 For when I try to see as clearly as possible back into the dawning spiritual state 
of the child I was, I can see very well that I did not love the God of my 
childhood, but only made use of Him. 
 
In Keller’s Switzerland, where a republican polity was matched by an 
educational culture of which public theology was a crucial component, the 
dialectical relationship between politics, culture and society was often 
articulated in theological terms. This is the culture which Keller’s realism 
imaginatively analyses. Switzerland produces in Keller the first great social 
realist of the German-speaking world, in whose work narrative realism 
combines with a philosophically and theologically informed imagination to 
produce a kind of critical realism comparable in scope and distinction to that of 
George Eliot in England.  
This kind of realism never develops in mid-nineteenth century Germany; 
especially, there is at mid-century no German realist novel with a comparable 
treatment of the relationship between social and religious consciousness. 
However, after 1871 a specific form of literary realism develops in nineteenth-
century German literature which has a remarkably modern inflection and 
anticipates some of the insights of both Naturalism and Modernism. What gives 
to that literature its truly European stature is that, whilst it remains centrally 
concerned with the discourse of late nineteenth-century German society, which 
continues to be decisively influenced by a the language of faith, it is also a 
literature of critical realism: one in which the relationship between discourse 
and experience is not just reflected, but analysed and exposed. 
 
II 1871-1900: The Theological Context of Late German Realism 
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that both the difference and the 
similarity between the functions of literature and religion in the culture of 
German-speaking Europe between 1830 and 1900 are the product of a process 
of secularization. That process was expressed at least as much by the evolution 
of subjective consciousness as it was by the objective development of German 
society. The two kinds of development were by no mean synchronized. Indeed, 
as we have seen, an objective process of secularization was often accompanied 
by a subjective discourse, expressed not least in the literature of the age, which 
continued to be strongly influenced by religion in its idiom and expression.  
The key philosophical—and, in the wider culture, theological—influence 
in late nineteenth-century Germany was the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-
1900). Nietzsche's influence on Christian theology both inside and outside 
Germany has of course been immense, not least because of the particular 
account of the aftermath of Christian civilization which his cultural and 
psychological critique of Christian belief suggests. However, it is not 
Nietzsche’s arguments against Christianity but the generic effect of his thought 
on German culture which is most relevant to the relationship between religion 
and literature in late nineteenth-century Germany and warrants some extended 
treatment. What, then, is really theologically or culturally new about 
Nietzsche’s thought? It is that, when Nietzsche writes of the ‘Death of God’, he 
really means it. That is to say, he means it in a way incompatible with the 
continuation of Christian tradition in any sense which German theology or 
culture is able to define. Nietzsche’s affirmation is real because it is made self-
consciously and deliberately not within the terms of his culture but against 
them. Of course, we as his readers in the early twenty-first century can and must 
reinterpret his words in terms of the difference between his time and our own. 
But the actual impact of those words depends on how they are addressed to, and 
how they are received by, Nietzsche’s contemporaries. Let us look in detail at 
the key paragraph in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science, 1882). The 
madman (‘der tolle Mensch’) who is the mouthpiece of Nietzsche’s utterance is 
really looking for God. What is less certain for Nietzsche’s readers, it seems, is 
the existence of the speaker himself. His narrator has to challenge them into 
believing in the man’s existence: 
 
Habt ihr nicht von jenem tollen Menschen gehört, der am hellen Vormittage 
eine Laterne anzündete, auf dem Markt lief und unaufhörlich schrie: ‘Ich suche 
Gott! Ich suche Gott!’26 
 
Have you never heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the broad light of 
morning and run into the market square, crying repeatedly ‘I’m looking for 
God! I’m looking for God!’ 
 
It is not the Death of God which Nietzsche’s madman first announces, but the 
fact that we have killed Him: 
 
‘Wohin ist Gott?’ rief er, ‘ich will es euch sagen! Wir haben ihn getödtet – ihr 
und ich! Wir alle sind seine Mörder!’ (III, 481)  
 
‘Where has God gone?’ he cried, ‘I want to tell you! We have killed him – you 
and me! We are all his murderers!’  
 
It is a real, not an impersonal ‘we’—you and I—who have killed Him. It is the 
realization of this stupendous fact which prompts the proliferation of 
extraordinary images which follow in Nietzsche’s text. The fact—the 
consequence of a deed which has already been committed—is a secret which 
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must be revealed by a madman. He can only disclose it—and therefore say for 
the first time that ‘God is dead’ (‘Gott ist todt’)—by pointing to its 
consequences of which the perpetrators are ignorant:  
 
‘Hören wir noch Nichts von dem Lärm der Todtengräber, welche Gott 
begraben? Riechen wir noch nichts von der göttlichen Verwesung – auch Götter 
verwesen! Gott ist todt! Gott bleibt todt! Und wir haben ihn getödtet!’ (III, 481) 
 
‘Do we still not hear the sound of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do 
we still smell nothing of the divine decay? – Even gods decay! God is dead! 
God will stay dead! And we have killed him!  
 
This deed is the source of the greatest possible guilt because it is the greatest 
possible deed (the meaning of the word ‘great’ in Nietzsche’s text is beyond any 
ethical reference) which is the turning point of history, after which all those 
born into history will be born into a history higher than any of the past: 
 
‘Es gab nie eine größere That, - und wer nur immer nach uns geboren wird, 
gehört um dieser That willen in eine höhere Geschichte, als alle Geschichte 
bisher war!’(III, 481) 
 
‘There was never a greater deed than this, - and whoever will be born after us 
will enter because of this deed into a form of history higher than all of history 
before’.   
 
The madman can only alienate and confound his listeners because the secret he 
discloses not only has not but cannot be revealed to them; the ‘deed is further 
from them than the farthest star, but it is they who have committed it’ (‘Diese 
That ist ihnen noch ferner, als die fernsten Gestirne, - und doch haben sie 
dieselbe gethan’ (III, 481-2). The madman is said to have entered several 
churches on the same day and to have said a Requiem for the eternal God. 
When questioned he remarks that it is the churches which are the tombs and 
funeral monuments of God: 
 
‘Was sind denn diese Kirchen noch, wenn sie nicht die Grüfte und Grabmäler 
Gottes sind?’ (III, 482) 
 
‘What then are these churches if not the burial chambers and memorials of 
God?’ 
 
Nietzsche’s madman speaks of the ‘Death of God’ as ‘this tremendous event 
which is still coming and in motion’ (‘diess ungeheure Ereignis ist noch 
unterwegs und wandert’). It has still not reached human ears (‘es ist noch nicht 
bis zu den Ohren der Menschen gedrungen’), because just as ‘thunder and 
lightning and the light of the stars need time to reach us, so deeds, after they 
have happened, need time before they can be seen and heard’. ‘Blitz und 
Donner brauchen Zeit, das Licht der Gestirne brauchen Zeit, Thaten brauchen 
Zeit, auch nachdem sie geschehen sind, um gesehen und gehört zu werden‘ (III, 
481). But how can this be if those addressed have themselves committed the 
deed? 
    The ‘real’ event to which Nietzsche’s text alludes is predicated on the unreal 
consciousness by which that event is denied. The truth Nietzsche communicates 
is one which can only be recognized, not demonstrated. That is why Nietzsche’s 
text must necessarily be in the narrative mode: one in which a truth which is 
always ‘coming’ and ‘moving’ can only be expressed in the fictional history of 
an embodied person. The visual and sensory immediacy of Nietzsche’s imagery 
certainly suggests that his madman is such a person, indeed that the God whose 
death he announces has a real body, which can decay, even smell of 
putrefaction. But in what sense, if any, is it a realist narrative? It cannot be said 
to refer to or interpret a commonly shared ‘real’ world of human experience. 
What is however made real by Nietzsche’s writing is the absence of such a 
world in the culture of those he addresses: a culture which is defined not by 
what it is, but by what it is not. This consciousness of an encompassing and 
determining absence is changed by Nietzsche’s prose from a historical and 
psychological judgement into an immediate and irreducible fact of experience. 
Consider the following passage: 
 
‘Wer gab uns den Schwamm, um den ganzen Horizont wegzuwischen? Was 
thaten wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne losketteten? Wohin bewegt sie 
sich nun? Wohin bewegen wir uns? Fort von allen Sonnen? […] Haucht uns der 
leere Raum an? Ist es nicht kälter geworden? Kommt nicht immerfort die Nacht 
und mehr Nacht? Müssen nicht Laternen am Vormittage angezündet werden?’ 
(III, 481) 
 
‘Who gave us the cloth to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when 
we loosed this earth from its sun? Where does it go now? Where are we going? 
Will we be far from any sun?  Does not empty space breathe at us? Has it not 
got colder? Is not night and ever more night to come? Do not the lights have to 
be lit in the morning?’ 
 
Nietzsche’s images cannot be called similes or metaphors; nor (at least in this 
passage) part of a recognizable pattern of allegory. Rather, Nietzsche's discourse 
is the objective correlative of a world in which all allegory has become 
impossible, because all culturally mediated tradition is experienced as the 
absence, not the presence, of truth. It is the most adequate expression of what 
might be called a manifest secret—the real but unrecognized truth—which lies 
behind Nietzsche’s critique of both Christianity and culture. That is that 
European, especially German, culture is informed neither by the reality, nor (by 
the same token) any credible cultural expression of Christian belief. The 
remarkable power of Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’ narrative lies in its capacity to 
enable the recognition of this truth. It can do that precisely because Nietzsche in 
this discourse does not address his readers, just as his madman does not address 
his listeners, in historical or psychological—that is to say in cultural—terms. 
For, in the culture which Nietzsche addresses, such terms are likely to prevent, 
not enable, the insight he is most concerned to convey. However, in the broader 
sense, Nietzsche’s theological critique is also a critique of the German culture 
of his age, and one which has a direct relevance to the modulation of German 
literary realism after 1871. The text in which the link between Nietzsche’s 
theological and cultural critique is most apparent is the first of his 
Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen (Untimely Meditations, 1873) which is a polemic 
against Strauss, especially Strauss’s book Der alte und der neue Glaube (The 
Old and the New Faith, 1872). 
In his tract on Strauss Nietzsche analyses the cultural consciousness of 
his age, first in historical and aesthetic categories, then in the theological ones 
which he perceives to underlie them. What Nietzsche most attacks in his culture 
is a false concept of the real (‘das Wirkliche’) which is identified with the truth 
and taken as the basis not only for aesthetic and cultural, but also ethical and 
theological, judgement. This idea of the real, Nietzsche suggests, is nothing 
more than an abstraction derived from the experience of what he calls the 
‘cultured Philistine’ (‘Bildungsphilister’) (I, 165). Such a character treats his 
own ‘reality’ as the criterion for judging the adequacy of his experience of truth 
or reason (I, 170). In a clear allusion to Hegelian Idealism, Nietzsche suggests 
that the Philistine masks the inadequacy of his cultural judgement with 
philosophy, especially one which appeals to the rationality of the real (ibid.). 
This is a culture in which a discourse of the real leads to an avoidance of reality 
and an intense public preoccupation with history leads to an alienation of the 
present from any real connection to the past. For Nietzsche, this false historical 
realism is also the source of Strauss’s attempt in The Old and the New Faith to 
expound the doctrine of a new post-Christian religion whilst denying that he is 
doing anything of the kind. Strauss can therefore claim to offer ‘a catechism of 
modern ideas’ (‘Katechismus der modernen Ideen’) and to build the ‘world-
highway of the future’ (‘Weltstrasse der Zukunft’) (I, 175) whilst conceding that 
the time has not yet come to destroy the Church or to create a new one. He is 
simply a ‘new believer’ (‘neuer Gläubiger’) with a ‘new kind of faith’ (‘neuen 
Glauben’). But the word ‘faith’ must (if Strauss’s argument is to make sense at 
all) retain its old and therefore implicitly Christian meaning. According to 
Strauss’s logic, his new doctrine (‘neuer Glaube’) must express a real truth 
because it expresses the actual truth of the modern world. It must therefore 
inspire as much piety for the universe as the old believers had for their God: 
‘Wir fordern für unser Universum dieselbe Pietät, wie der Fromme alten Stils 
für Gott’ (I, 189) (‘We claim for our universe the same reverence which the old-
style believer had for God’). 
Nietzsche’s polemical strategy is not to attack any of the doctrines of 
Strauss’s ‘new faith’ but to expose the absurdity of a discourse about the 
‘reality’ of ‘faith’ which has no coherent idea of the meaning of either term. In 
particular, he suggests, the four questions with which Strauss heads the sections 
of his book are neither answered nor convincingly linked by Strauss’s argument 
(I, 210). Strauss, Nietzsche argues, has no coherent ‘Christian’ theology at all 
and therefore no idea of how such a theology might relate to any intellectually 
defensible idea of either ‘religion’ as such or the contemporary world. The first 
question asked in Strauss’s text - ‘What is our conception of the world? (‘Wie 
begreifen wir die Welt?’) -  is a question about the relationship of faith to 
conceptual thought and therefore the possibility of rational faith. This had been 
the chief preoccupation of German philosophical theology at least since Kant. 
However, in Strauss’s work it is simply ignored, because the results of that 
theology are taken for granted and assumed to be expressed in the liberal 
Protestant Christianity of late nineteenth-century Germany. The second question 
‘How do we order our life?’ (‘Wie ordnen wir unser Leben?’) addresses the 
relationship of both faith and reason to moral choice and ethical action. This 
question, Nietzsche argues, is similarly elided because the answer is supposed 
to be apparent in the ‘real’—that is to say, the historically actual—cultural 
achievements of the age. His critique is as apposite to literary as it is to 
theological realism. For Nietzsche, Strauss’s thought is defined by the 
combination of an uncritical assent to ‘reality’ and an equally arbitrary 
withdrawal from it: an apparently indiscriminate affirmation of the truth of 
modernity which always retains the option of withdrawal into the inner domain 
of a truth supposedly superior to the truth of the ‘real’ world. This pseudo-
theology licenses any number of attitudes to contemporary events (I, 199): an 
admiration for Bismarck, Moltke and the aristocratic spirit as much as a 
notional concern with social progress; a scientific admiration for Darwin as well 
as the recommendation of an inner religion of feeling. Nietzsche savagely 
remarks that Strauss neglects to tell us whether the new believer reads the 
Pietist works of Spener or the Prussian Nationalzeitung over his morning coffee 
(I, 179). The satire is instructive because it both imitates and debunks what 
Nietzsche identifies as the characteristic style of his opponent. Nietzsche 
remarks that Strauss’s obsession with the value and significance of the modern 
moment - the ‘time now’ (‘Jetztzeit’) (I, 221) leads to a proliferation of 
metaphors taken from the actuality of the modern world (I, 222-3) - railways, 
the telegraph, the stock exchange or the theory of evolution - applied 
indiscriminately to an unlimited variety of objects. Such a style must necessarily 
fail in its apparent intention - really to evoke the immediacy of actual 
experience - because it mistakenly assumes that what is ‘modern’ is really new. 
This kind of style is both reflected and sometimes subjected to radical critique 
in the work of the greatest late nineteenth-century German realists and their 
naturalist successors.  Nietzsche’s emphasis on Strauss’s style is entirely apt. 
For Strauss’s ‘style’ is the literary expression of a form of aesthetic 
consciousness which, although it masquerades as the expression of moral or 
even theological truth, is essentially disengaged from the worlds it surveys: in 
Kierkegaard’s terms, a consciousness which is aesthetically interested whilst 
ethically disinterested in experience.27   
This is the opposite of Nietzsche’s understanding of the true meaning of 
the aesthetic. Nietzsche does indeed remark in his essay Die Geburt der 
Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (On the Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of 
Music, 1871) that the world is eternally justified only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon (I, 47). But this affirmation must be seen in the context of an 
analysis of the birth of tragedy from the non-representational art of music. In 
late nineteenth-century Germany, the other great exponent of the relationship 
between aesthetic and religious experience was Richard Wagner (1813-1883). 
The aesthetic, for Nietzsche like Schopenhauer but unlike Wagner, can be a 
mode of truth only because it is not a representation of the truth but the image of 
the ultimate energy of the will. That is why Nietzsche, once strongly influenced 
by Wagner, later sharply rejects the work of Wagner whom he describes in his 
essay Der Fall Wagner (The Case of Wagner, 1888) as ‘the artist of decadence’ 
(‘der Künstler der Decadence’ (VI, 21))—when Wagner implicitly presents his 
music as the vehicle of a new quasi-religious myth of German culture.28 
Nietzsche (as his essay on Wagner makes clear) emphatically rejects any 
attempt to replace theology with aesthetics. The emphasis in Nietzsche’s work 
most relevant to our theme is his concern, at least as relevant to literature as it is 
to religion and philosophy, with how ultimate truth is to be represented, when 
neither the self-conscious insight of philosophy nor the culturally embodied 
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practice of religion are adequate to the task. The next section will consider the 
relevance of that concern to the practice of German realism in the work of the 
two greatest German narrative realists after 1871: Theodor Fontane (1819-1898) 
and Wilhelm Raabe (1831-1910).  
The realism of Theodor Fontane is concerned above all with the 
representation of discourse in a society where a theologically and 
philosophically tinged semantics decisively affects the public understanding of 
social and political problems. The key medium of this critique of discourse in 
Fontane is the representation of dialogue, of which Fontane more than any other 
nineteenth-century German novelist was a master.29 Fontane emphasizes the 
plane of discourse precisely in order to lay bare the distance between that plane 
and the ‘real’—the word here has a meaning which only literature can give to 
it—world of human experience and action. That narrative disclosure also 
reveals the inadequacy of ideological attempts to bridge the gap, indeed to 
pretend that the difference does not exist. The tendency to transpose real moral 
conflicts onto the plane of discourse is not invented by Fontane’s realism. It is a 
central feature of the culture which that realism represents and one which raises 
questions about the cultural function of ‘religion’ as much as ‘literature’. What 
really matters in Fontane’s portrayal of religion is not the critique or 
endorsement of any particular theological doctrine but his exploration of the 
implicit and explicit contradictions between a theologically inflected discourse 
and the real political and social context—and therefore the moral choices— 
which such theological language serves to legitimate. 
One of the most impressive of Fontane’s dialogic sequences comes in the latter 
part of his late novel Der Stechlin (Stechlin, 1898). Here especially Fontane’s 
portrayal of dialogue satirizes the false identification of a theologically 
incoherent and practically ineffectual cultural Protestantism with the 
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glorification of technical progress–even a certain rhetoric of political and social 
equality – which dominate the public rhetoric of the age. Some of his dialogues 
seem to echo Nietzsche’s savage satire of the ‘modern believer’ as he or she is 
represented in Strauss’s The Old and the New Faith. A particular target is the 
figure of Pastor Lorenzen who attempts to combine theological orthodoxy with 
respect for the limited programme of social progress espoused by the anti-
Semitic Christian-Social movement of Hofprediger (‘Court Chaplain’) Adolf 
Stöcker and incongruously cites the Portuguese social missionary Joao de Deus 
as an exemplar of Christian commitment: 
 
‘Dieser Joao de Deus’, so etwa waren seine Worte, ‘war genau das, was ich 
wohl sein möchte, wonach ich suche, seit ich zu leben, wirklich zu leben 
angefangen, und wovon es beständig draußen in der Welt heißt, es gäbe 
dergleichen nicht mehr. Aber es gibt dergleichen noch, es muß dergleichen 
geben oder doch wieder geben’.30 
 
‘This Joao de Deus’, he said in so many words, ‘was exactly that which I would 
like to be, what I’ve been looking for ever since I’ve been really alive. It’s 
something which the world says no longer exists. But people like that do still 
live; they must still live or at least live again’. 
 
The figure Lorenzen here invokes as the inspiration of his real being, even the 
fruit of a kind of evangelical conversion (‘seit ich […] wirklich zu leben 
angefangen’) (‘since I’ve been really alive’) is the supposedly renewed presence 
of authentic Christianity in modern society. However what is ‘real’ (‘wirklich’) 
is here understood neither culturally nor theologically as what is embodied or 
expressed in actual experience, but as something which must be made real by an 
                                                          
30 Theodor Fontane, Der Stechlin, in Werke, ed. by Walter Keitel, 20 vols. (Münich; Cal Hanser, 1969), vol. V, 
p. 158. 
act of existential commitment: that ethic of inner commitment which Max 
Weber (1864-1920) in his essay Politik und Beruf (Politics as a Vocation, 1920) 
calls Gesinnungsethik and sharply distinguishes from the ethic of political 
responsibility (Verantwortungsethik).31 In this society, the theological 
equivalent of this distinction is the ‘two kingdoms’ (‘zwei Reiche’) doctrine of 
classical Lutheranism32 which distinguishes between the right to spiritual 
freedom and the obligation to obey the secular power in worldly affairs. At the 
time Fontane was writing in 1898, no less than when Weber wrote twenty two 
years later, that doctrine frequently avoided responsible political application. 
When the ageing Junker Dubslav von Stechlin calls for an actual example of 
modern heroism (‘Heldentum’), Lorenzen’s response is crucially revealing. He 
tells an anecdote about the American polar explorer Lieutenant Greeley who is 
acquitted of murder, having shot without trial one of his party who steals food 
from his fellows. Lorenzen approves of Greeley’s conduct, but when asked for 
his criterion of judgement can appeal only to the idea of inner conviction (‘die 
Gesinnung entscheidet’) or even of a uniquely personal idea or decision 
(‘Echtes Heldentum […] steht immer im Dienst einer Eigenidee, eines 
allereigensten Entschlusses’) (V, 342). Most remarkably, it is the closeness of 
such a decision to crime (‘wenn dieser Entschluß schon das Verbrechen streift’) 
which in Greeley’s eyes appears to recommend it, or even to turn what is base 
into what is highest (‘ein Niedrigstes als Höchstes’). What concretely is 
approved is the fact that Greeley did not sacrifice himself and did not follow the 
imperative of his own conscience: 
 
‘Greeley, statt zu tun, was er tat, hätte zu den Gefährten sagen können […] 
“unser Exempel wird falsch […] sterben wir also alle”. […] Aber es handelte  
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sich nicht nur um ihn, er hatte die Führer- und die Befehlshaberrolle […] und 
hatte die Majorität von drei gegen eine Minorität zu schützen.’ (V, 343) 
 
‘Instead of doing what he did, Greeley could have said to his comrades: “Our 
conduct is no longer exemplary […] so we have all got to die”. […] But he 
wasn’t the only man there, he had the task of leading and giving orders […] and 
had to defend a majority of three against a minority of one.’ 
 
Thus extrajudicial murder is justified on the basis of a majority vote, but assent 
to it is praised by this Lutheran minister as an act of true courage (‘der wahre 
Mut’) and yet described as a ‘fearful something’ to be justified only by the 
imperatives of the moment and which contradicts ‘all divine commandments, all 
law and all honour’ (‘ein fürchtbares Etwas […] das […] allem göttlichen 
Gebot, allem Gesetz und aller Ehre widerspricht.’) (V, 344) 
 One of the most quoted sentences of Stechlin—Dubslav von Stechlin’s 
‘Wenn ich das Gegenteil gesagt hätte wäre es ebenso richtig’ (‘If I had said the 
opposite it would also be true’) V, 27)—could equally be applied to the 
exchange about the discussion of Lieutenant Greeley’s responsibility for his 
acts. In fact, Dubslav’s comment is made in an earlier dialogue  (V, 26-27) 
about the significance of modern inventions like the telegraph, which 
immediately reports events such as the Paris Commune of 1871 but is said to 
lack ‘reliability’(‘Verbindlichkeit’) and to report such events so indiscriminately 
that one might be confused with another. What is apparent in this apparently 
incidental exchange—and what relates it to the much more serious one just 
quoted—is a disengaged attitude to real historical facts which makes any 
attitude to them seem equally plausible. When this attitude acquires the cultural 
sanction of theology—indeed when it is falsely represented as the expression of 
Christian conscience—the consequences are indeed disturbing: the endorsement 
of inhumanity by a consciousness which, because it is never humanly engaged 
by the experience about which it reflects, remains pure because free from 
contamination by the consequences of the acts to which it directly leads.33  
   In Wilhelm Raabe’s late and possibly greatest novel Die Akten des 
Vogelsangs (Chronicles of the Vogelsang, 1896) the contrast between discourse 
and reality is even starker, precisely because it is not masked by cultural 
convention but revealed by the experience of a profoundly alienated central 
character who lives on the margins of culture itself. In Vogelsang an internal 
narrator, Karl Krumhardt, chronicles the decline into insanity of his childhood 
friend Andres Velten. Velten, a literal as well as metaphorical orphan, never 
knows his father and is brought up by a mentally unstable mother and 
befriended during his adolescence by his childhood sweetheart Helene 
Trotzendorff as well as Karl and his family. After briefly studying medicine in 
Berlin, where he lodges with the French Huguenot family of Leonie des Beaux, 
he follows his sweetheart Helene to America where she abandons him to marry 
the dollar millionaire Mungo before returning to the Vogelsang district after his 
death. Krumhardt’s chronicling of this process is also the record of the decline 
of the Vogelsang district which is transformed by industrialization from a semi-
rural enclave into an industrial suburb. Crucially it is also the third-person 
narrative of a process which is also narrated in the first person by Velten 
himself. That is Velten’s withdrawal into social isolation and eventual mental 
disintegration, in which he first burns the furniture of his beloved childhood 
home for firewood and then destroys that home itself, inviting passers-by to 
plunder its contents. 
Karl Krumhardt, Raabe’s fictional narrator, town clerk and author of the 
‘documents’, reflects on whether he can represent what he has to describe at all; 
the descent into mental illness and then the death of his childhood friend: 
                                                          
33 Fontane characterized the leading articles of the Kreuzzeitung (from which he resigned as a correspondent in 
1870) as the expression of just such a notionally “Christian” rhetoric which disguises real brutality. See 
Fontane’s letter to his wife of 11 May 1870, in Fontane, Geliebte Ungeduld: Der Ehebriefwechsel 1857-1871, 
ed. by Gotthard and Therese Erler (Berlin: Aufbau 1990), pp. 475-6 
 Was kann ich heute an seinem Grabhügel andres sein als sein nüchterner 
Protokollführer in seinem siegreich gewonnenen Prozeß gegen meine, gegen 
unsre Welt?34 
 
Standing at his grave today what else can I be but a sober recorder of the case 
which he brought and won against my world, against ours? 
 
What can he be, Krumhardt asks himself, but the ‘court clerk’ or ‘taker of 
minutes’ (‘Protokollführer’) at the trial in which that friend has brought a 
lawsuit against the world. In this novel Velten is not a particular eccentric but 
its central character. He has indeed triumphantly won (‘siegreich gewonnen’) 
the suit he has brought against the world, which Krumhardt acknowledges as 
‘my own’ (‘meine’) and ‘our’ (‘unsere’) shared world. For what Velten has 
destroyed in his own and his fellows’ actually existing world is the possibility 
of living in any world which we can experience or interpret together and 
therefore make our own: what Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926) in the Duineser 
Elegien (The Duino Elegies, 1922) was to call ‘the interpreted world’ (‘die 
gedeutete Welt’).35 His destruction of things is really the destruction of any 
context in which human beings can recognize—that is to say, in which they can 
represent (‘vorstellen’)—themselves. This action is also the destruction of 
himself, because it is the destruction of that recognition of human selfhood in an 
objective world which is the precondition of what we call experience. This is 
what Velten describes as ‘an outward clearing out to match the inner one’ (‘ein 
äußerliches Aufräumen zu dem Innerlichen’) (XIX, 370). It is entirely fitting 
therefore that he is said to pronounce the word ‘Habseligkeiten’ (‘belongings’) 
in an alienated fashion which is not common in everyday speech (XIX, 371). 
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For the German word makes manifest the link which is broken by his action; the 
connection between ‘having’ (‘haben’) things and belonging to a human world 
(the German word unmistakeably suggests ‘blessed’ (‘selig’) and ‘blessedness’ 
(‘Seligkeit’)). 
The most important allusion in this text to the inherited repertoire of 
German culture is the verse from Goethe which Velten chalks on the wall of his 
deathroom and which is alluded to several times in the text: 
 
Sei gefühllos 
Ein leichtbewegtes Herz 
Ist ein elend Gut 
Auf der wankenden Erde (XIX, 352) 
 
Be without feeling! 
A feeling heart 
Is a burden 
In this inconstant world 
 
Velten is not really interested in Goethe. Nor (as his dialogue with Krumhardt 
makes clear) does he take seriously the German idea of Gemütlichkeit 
(‘emotional warmth’) to which he often ironically refers. He introduces the 
verse as just another cultural tag he has heard in his childhood at Frau 
Trotzendorff’s salon and parodies the eighteen-year old Goethe who authored 
the verse as an eighteenth-century dandy (‘ein frühreifer Lebensheld in Ruder, 
Kniehose, seidenen Strumpfen und Schnallenschuhen’) (‘a precocious man 
about town in a powdered wig, knickerbockers, silk stockings and buckled 
shoes’) (XIX, 352). Raabe’s fictional character Velten has no real relationship 
to the literary past for the same reason that he has no real relationship to the 
present: because he cannot connect the experience which ‘literary history’ 
(Literaturgeschichte’) might offer to anything in his own experience (XIX, 370). 
His deliberate breaking of any connection to the German cultural tradition is 
articulated through literary allusions which are steeped in that tradition. 
However, his desire absolutely to break with the past derives from a 
consciousness of all objective tradition as inauthentic and therefore as a threat to 
the authentic self. That is the perception that his tradition, because its meaning 
has been comprehensively deconstructed by reflective critique, cannot 
command real assent, but only notional obedience.36 However, his 
consciousness of that deconstruction, because its terms remain defined by the 
tradition to which he is still bound, can never be a source of liberation. Rather, 
his consciousness of his own alienation can only be the radically self-
reinforcing one which Hegel called ‘the unhappy consciousness’ (‘das 
unglückliche Bewusstsein’).37 The literary as well as the religious history of 
nineteenth-century Germany amply supports Hegel’s judgement that such 
alienation has implicitly theological roots. 
What matters in this text is not any subjective affirmation of cultural 
allegiance its hero might make but its objective consequences. The world of 
Vogelsang is one in which the legacy of Idealism in German literature and 
philosophy remains present only in a series of self-negating literary and 
philosophical allusions. Its real context is the post-Nietzschean world in which 
the word ‘truth’, if it means anything at all, means the truth of natural science; 
not religion, theology or metaphysical philosophy. It is fitting that the one 
character whom Raabe’s hero Velten admits to the home he is destroying (apart 
from his friend Leonie des Beaux) is the circus performer Herr German Fell 
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who pretends to be the ‘missing link’ of evolutionary theory and acts the part of 
an ape. The effect of Fell’s act depends upon the fact that he can let fall ‘the dull 
fetters of the beast’ (‘der Tierheit dumpfe Schranke’) and suddenly become 
human again: 
 
Er stieg, sozusagen, aus dem Pavian oder Gorilla heraus, die geschmeidigen 
Muskeln steiften sich und – Menschheit trat auf die entwölkte Stirn. (XIX, 380) 
 
He climbed, so to speak, out of the form of a baboon or gorilla, his flexible 
muscles stiffened and – humanity appeared on his unclouded countenance. 
 
This character, whose value is conferred on him only by science and its great 
contemporary exponents, says that he is attractive to Velten because of this kind 
of authenticity: because he can step out of his own skin, instead of (like the 
majority) only leaving it behind at death: 
 
‘Siehe da’, habe ich mir gesagt, ‘auch einmal wieder einer, der aus seiner Haut 
steigt, während die übrigen nur daraus fahren möchten!’ (XIX, 381) 
 
‘Look’, I said to myself, ‘there’s another one who can step out of his skin, 
whilst others would dearly like to leave it behind!’  
 
Yet this supposed capacity, which only a theatrical performer can appreciate, 
does not bring Velten closer to humanity; it makes him resemble its opposite. 
Raabe’s hero has severed the connection which links him not to a particular 
world of experience (nor to any particular religion or its secular surrogate) but 
to Being itself. What places Raabe’s realism in this text on the border between 
literary and theological discourse is not that Raabe proposes any answer to the 
question of the ultimate meaning of existence. It is that he poses the question at 
all, and shows it to underlie every other question which is posed in the text 
about the interpretation of experience. By the same token Raabe’s work 
represents the end of one strand of classical realism in the German speaking 
world and its modulation into modernism.  
However, late nineteenth-century Germany produces another form which 
is equally relevant to our theme: the naturalist drama, of which the greatest 
exponent is Gerhard Hauptmann (1862-1946). Drama rather than the novel is in 
many ways the form most appropriate to the representation of discourse, both 
because of its focus on oral speech and dialogue and because it is distinguished 
by the autonomy and immediacy of its form.38 In his major dramas Hauptmann 
exploits to the full these characteristics of dramatic form in works of social 
realism, several of which offer a complex account of the presence of 
Christianity in German society, which is often expressed through a dialogic 
presentation of Christian language in relation to other modes of discourse in the 
same social context. In his late play Die Ratten (The Rats, 1911), for instance, 
Hauptmann offers a dramatic portrayal of the inhabitants of a Berlin slum, 
several under the influence of drugs, drink or mental degeneration, which in its 
quasi-scientific precision of detail and authenticity of dialogue rivals the work 
of Zola. The down-at-heel theatre director and slum landlord Hanno 
Hassenreuter lives from the rents paid by the inhabitants of a Berlin tenement in 
which he retains a theatrical wardrobe on the top floor. His tenants include the 
morphine addict Frau Knobbe, the pregnant Polish servant girl Pauline 
Pipperkarcka, Frau John, the wife of an itinerant building worker and charlady 
for Hassenreuter and the former theological student, pastor’s son and would-be 
actor Spitta. The last character is the most interesting, not because he has or has 
not lost his faith, but because of the way he introduces a theological discourse 
into a world which is permeated by the language of the theatre and therefore a 
discourse about representation. 
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Spitta abandons his studies and trains as an actor with Hassenreuter 
because his strictly Lutheran father has thrown his sister out of the family home 
after she is seduced and (it is implied) made pregnant by the scion of an 
aristocratic family for whom she is working as a governess.39 Disgusted with 
what he sees as the false piety of his upbringing he seeks refuge in the modern 
theatre, but his worst fears are confirmed when he discovers that the training he 
is offered is of the ‘unnatural Schillerian, Goethean, Weimar school’ (‘Schiller-
Goethisch-Weimarische Schule der Unnatur’) (IV, 446). The aspiring young 
actor is disappointed because his would-be tutor openly declares himself to be 
the epigone of a dead tradition. A tragi-comic parody of a disillusioned cleric 
seeking salvation in art, Spitta declares that German drama must be rejuvenated 
in the spirit of the young Lessing, Goethe and Schiller (IV, 477). Spitta appeals 
to the dramatic theory of Lessing, which he says contains ‘axioms adapted to 
the fullness of art and the riches of life and are adequate to nature itself’ (‘dort 
stehen Sätze, die der Fülle der Kunst und dem Reichtum des Lebens, die der 
Natur gewachsen sind’) IV, 477). Hassenreuter responds by calling him a ‘rat’ 
(IV, 478) and arguing that there is a ‘plague of rats’ (‘Rattenplage’) 
undermining ‘idealism’ in both German art and German society. 
This is a tragi-comedy indeed, for whilst the eccentric theatre director and 
the earnest ex-theologian are debating the conditions for the successful 
continuation of German classical tragedy, a real tragedy of child abduction, 
teenage pregnancy and murder is unfolding around them. Pastor Spitta, 
Lutheran minister and Erich Spitta’s father, arrives on the scene and opines that 
‘so-called scientific theology which flirts with every heathen philosopher’ (die 
sogennante wissenschaftliche Theologie, die mit allen heidnischen Philosophen 
liebaügelt’) (IV, 484) is no less responsible than the fleshpots of Berlin for his 
son’s decision to abandon his studies just before his theological finals. The 
father’s judgement is credible, for his son really does have a social conscience 
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and espouses a social gospel which he sees as the antithesis of his father’s 
established Church (IV, 508). However, the kind of theology to which his son 
would have been exposed in a German university at the end of the nineteenth 
century would not be any radical social gospel, but the Kulturprotestantismus 
(‘Protestant theology of culture’) of theologians like Albrecht Ritschl (1822-
1889) and Adolf von Harnack (1851-1930) which dominated the German 
theological schools of the day and preached a form of liberal historicist 
Christianity largely indistinguishable from a Kantian ethic of moral self-respect 
and social progress.40 Hassenreuter aptly remarks (IV, 484-5) that Erich is not 
the first theologian to desert their calling for literature and the stage: Lessing 
and Herder did so too. The irony, of course, lies on both sides of the equation. 
Given the actual environment—a tenement in fin de siècle Berlin—in which the 
question is posed, the question of the ability of organized religion to perpetuate 
the legacy of actual faith can only appear comic, if also tragic. For what is 
largely absent in the society in which the drama is set is any credible doctrine of 
the relevance of either ‘religion’ or ‘art’ to the modern world. The achievement 
of Hauptmann’s drama is to show us this by the juxtaposition of aesthetic and 
religious discourses with the social facts they both claim to articulate. 
Hauptmann’s drama can be described as ‘naturalist’ because of its minute 
portrayal of environment and recording of ordinary speech, not because of any 
suggestion that consciousness itself can be reduced to environment. What 
matters is the way different modes of consciousness can or cannot authentically 
interpret experience. Hauptmann is far from endorsing the thesis that tragedy, 
because of its supposed metaphysical presuppositions, can no longer express the 
truth of modernity. The real question posed in this play, which is relevant to 
‘literature’ and ‘religion’ alike, is not whether but how the idea of tragedy—the 
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public articulation of the meaning of human suffering—can continue to be 
relevant in the modern world. 
As the century draws to an end, both naturalism and realism give way to a 
concern with the limits of language, narrative and representation which is 
equally relevant to the discourses of literature and religion. In the German-
speaking world, that concern will be expressed primarily in Austria and 
German-speaking central Europe in the work of writers like Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal (1874-1929), whose seminal essay Brief an Lord Chandos (Letter 
to Lord Chandos, 1902) was published at the beginning of the twentieth century 
and above all by Rilke and Kafka. The work of the greatest German realist of 
all, Thomas Mann (1875-1950) reaches into the twentieth century and in crucial 
ways defines German literature’s presence in it. The anticipation of the work of 
Thomas Mann—one of the most ‘secular’ of German writers but one for whom 
the social and cultural meaning of secularization is a central concern—is 
therefore an appropriate way to conclude this chapter. 
In his best known novel Buddenbrooks, published on the very threshold 
of the twentieth century in 1900, the connection between aesthetic and religious 
consciousness is constantly thematized. Both the informing presence and the 
gradual waning of the influence of North German Protestantism, especially its 
ethic of civic duty and the subordination of the private to the public realm, are 
central to the process of the decay of a family which the novel chronicles. One 
of its central episodes—Thomas Buddenbrook’s reading of Schopenhauer 
shortly before his death—represents both the dissolution of the stern Protestant 
ethic which had governed his youth and its replacement, all the more poignant 
because it is an illusion based on a misinterpretation, by a supposedly aesthetic 
alternative. Buddenbrook, plagued by his increasing perception of the 
hollowness of his inherited work ethic and the suspected infidelity of his wife, 
reads the section of Schopenhauer’s (1788-1860) Die Welt als Wille und 
Vorstellung (The World as Will and Representation, 1818) entitled ‘Vom Tod in 
seinem Verhältnis zur Unzerstörbarkeit unsers Wesens an sich’ (‘Concerning 
Death in Relation to the Indestructibility of our Being in Itself’).41 The effect is 
one of liberation: 
 
Die Mauern seiner Vaterstadt, in denen er sich mit Willen und Bewußtsein 
eingeschlossen, taten sich auf und erschlossen seinem Blicke die Welt, die 
ganze Welt, von der er in jungen Jahren dies und jenes Stückchen gesehen, und 
die der Tod ihm ganz und gar zu schenken versprach.42 
 
The walls of his ancestral city, in which his will and consciousness had confined 
him, opened up and let him see the world, the world as a whole, of which in his 
youth he had seen this or that particular part and which death now simply 
offered him as a gift.  
 
Yet the upshot of this reading is the opposite of Schopenhauer’s philosophical 
import. Thomas does not understand what Schopenhauer means: that the 
affirmation of the will must give way to an act of resignation which can be 
motivated and understood not in voluntary or intellectual but only in aesthetic 
terms. Instead, he interprets the passage to mean that we can know the ultimate 
significance of what Schopenhauer calls ‘the world as will’. That, in Thomas’s 
understanding, is that the ultimate meaning of the moral life of the individual 
consists in an essential ‘will’ that transcends it, one which is manifest in all of 
humanity but not to be grasped from the standpoint of the individual. Thomas 
believes that his own life, now coming to an end, will be reborn in all those who 
in future will say ‘I’, especially those who say it most confidently and 
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authentically. He associates this idea with the future of his son, Hanno, who in 
reality will die in pain from typhus at the age of sixteen. 
      This tragic misunderstanding, and a great novelist’s interpretation of it, 
surely bespeaks a truth as relevant to ‘religion’ as it is to ‘literature’ in 
nineteenth-century German culture and its sequel. In the German-speaking 
world between 1830 and 1900 both literature and religion – sometimes in 
different ways, sometimes in strikingly similar ones – are at odds with the 
culture and society in which they are engaged. However, precisely that distance 
can be a remarkable source of insight, because it tells us as much about the 
culture and society of the German-speaking world as it does about the ways 
literature and religion are present within it. The link between literature and 
religion in our period does not uncritically reflect what Terry Eagleton called an 
‘ideology of the aesthetic’.43 Rather it suggests a way in which literature can 
reveal in that culture contradictions between actual experience and its 
intellectual articulation.  What we call “religion” and “literature” are always 
more than social facts or sources of doctrine, although of course they include 
both. They are forms of human life. Both can embody an immediacy of 
communication – a capacity to show, not tell – which are especially relevant to 
a culture, like much of German-speaking Europe between 1830 and 1900, in 
which the life of the mind has become separated, sometimes productively but 
often with disabling effect, from the life of society. The ‘literature’ and 
‘religion’ we have considered are certainly products of that culture; but they can 
also illuminate, transcend and critically understand it. 
 
 
                                                          
43 See Terry Eagleton, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).  
